When the International Criminal Court (ICC) announced an arrest warrant for the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, for the crimes of unlawful deportation and unlawful transfer of children, in March this year, few could have seen it coming. For one, it is a near-certainty that any attempt to invade Russia to arrest Putin would lead to a dramatic escalation of the war in Ukraine, with the real threat of nuclear reprisal.

Three months later, Vladimir Putin was not arrested, nor had any attempt been made to pursue his arrest. It seems reasonable to suggest that the real purpose of the arrest warrant was to isolate Putin internationally. More specifically, it was meant to throw a wedge between Russia and South Africa. Both Russia and South Africa are members of BRICS, an acronym for an economic alliance formed by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa as a counterweight to the economic might of the US and EU. The group is scheduled to meet in South Africa in August this year.

With an international arrest warrant issued for Vladimir Putin, South Africa, in theory, will be expected to arrest him if he sets foot on its territory. That’s not likely to play out in reality. South Africa, like most African nations, officially proclaims its neutrality in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. However, unofficially, its actions and the utterances of certain public figures within the ruling African National Congress (ANC) paint a different picture.

Straddling the Fence

A few weeks after the announcement of the ICC warrant, the government of South Africa made a half-hearted threat to leave the ICC. Speaking at the time, President Cyril Ramaphosa referenced views from within his party, the ANC, about the perceived inequality of the ICC prosecutions, which have focused almost exclusively on offenders from Africa.

At a press conference with Sauli Niinistö, the President of Finland, Ramaphosa said, “Our view is that we would like this matter of unfair treatment to be properly discussed…but in the meantime, the governing party has decided once again that there should be a pullout.”

Ramaphosa eventually walked back on this threat within hours, with a statesperson claiming that he had not intended to give the impression that South Africa would be leaving the ICC. The message, however, was clear: South Africa would be unwilling to take sides against Russia.

That was not all. In May, in an astonishing development, the US ambassador to South Africa, Reuben E. Brigety II, accused the country of arming Russia, claiming he was certain that a Russian vessel, The Lady R, which had docked in South Af,rica last yea,r had been loaded with arms meant for Russia.

Ambassador Brigety eventually walked back on this position, stating, “I was grateful for the opportunity to speak with [South African] Foreign Minister Pandor this evening and correct any misimpressions left by my public remarks. At our core, I reaffirmed the strong partnership between our two countries and the important agenda our presidents have given us.”

Despite appearing to recant his previous beliefs, much like South Africa recanting its threat to part ways with the ICC, the message was clear: The US believes South Africa has taken sides with Russia.

South Africa’s slow but steady drift towards eastern alignment is neither an isolated nor particularly new trend. Russia–or the old Soviet Union — as it then was, was a close ally of the ANC during the anti-apartheid movement, supplying its fighters with arms and ammunition, and guerrilla warfare. That South Africa is sticking with Russia, now, is merely the continuation of a decades-old friendship. But what would that imply for the future of US-South Africa relations?

The US foreign policy posture towards South Africa’s eastward dalliances has largely been on. However, patience appears to be wearing thin. A group of senators has now written to the White House demanding that South Africa be barred from hosting the 2023 AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) Forum, which is due to be held later this year.

South Africa is the US’s largest trade partner in US exports to South Africa, with US exports rising to a 10-year high of $15.7bn in 2021. The two nations are also military allies, though, ironically, South Africa participated in military drills with Russia and China in February this year. If they were to fall out, South Africa would take a significant economic hit–one that it would most likely look to BRICS to assuage.

More Trouble Across the Board?

South Africa is not the only African ally whose fidelity the US may have to worry about.  Across the continent, more and more countries are becoming increasingly reluctant to dance to Washington’s tune. As these countries look away from the US, their eyes tend, almost invariably, to turn towards BRICS.

In May this year, the Finance Ministers of Morocco, Nigeria, Senegal, Egypt, and Algeria attended the BRICS Expansion dialogue meeting, with Egypt and Algeria having already made a formal application to join the group.

BRICS as a group does not officially take anti-Western policy positions, and the majority of BRICS countries do substantial business with the US. However, one idea that has been suggested–first, by Alexander Zhukov, the deputy chairman of Russia’s state Duma (a department of the country’s parliament), and then echoed by Brazilian President Luiz Inàcio Lula da Silva, is the idea of a new, common currency to be operated between BRICS countries. If this idea comes to life, it would potentially mean the de-dollarization of the global economy.

On the continent, one man who has been drumming up support for the idea that African nations should ditch the dollar is Kenya’s President William Ruto. Ruto, elected on a populist wave in 2022, is not a big fan of the West and has repeatedly condemned the way African leaders are treated by their Western counterparts.

Under Ruto, Kenya, like South Africa, officially adopts a position of neutrality in relation to the war in Ukraine. In spite of this, the country has gone ahead with the bold step of entering trade discussions with Russia–disregarding the slew of Western sanctions meant to isolate the Kremlin.

Meeting in Nairobi on the 29th of May, the Russian Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, was hosted by President Ruto. The two parties discussed measures for growing the trade volume between their respective countries, as well as other international issues of mutual concern–including both parties’ disapproval of the current structure and functioning of the UN Security Council. The biggest takeaway was the announcement that Kenya would enter a trade pact with Russia.

Diplomatic Immunity

Coincidentally, just a day after this meeting, South Africa announced, without mentioning any specific names, that all leaders attending the BRICS meeting would have diplomatic immunity. Just as before, this comment has been walked back, with South Africa’s head of Diplomacy, Clason Onyela, tweeting, “These immunities do not override any warrant that may have been issued by any international tribunal against any attendee of the conference.”

The right of diplomatic immunity for foreign dignitaries such as heads of State or their delegates is a well-established principle of International Law, leaving one to wonder what extra immunities South Africa seeks to create and who, in light of Monyela’s clarification, these would be intended to protect.

While South Africa and Kenya have taken more aggressive positions in resisting a US-led Western dominance in African governance, there are other African states that have asserted their sovereignty somewhat more passively. For example, Egypt, which is mentioned, is seeking to join BRICS and has been a strong ally of the US in recent years. Thus, it was genuinely eyebrow-raising to learn that the country had ignored a US request to block Egyptian airspace to Russian planes transporting arms and ammunition from Syria to Russia.

The signs are clear. African nations are becoming more emboldened to chart their own courses and to align with allies who best support or promote their interests. Where this road will lead remains to be seen, but BRICS is likely to be an integral part of it.